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McCain's Account Of The Origins Of The Financial Crisis

25 Mar 2008 11:16 am

Speaking today on the housing crunch, Sen. John McCain provides this account of the crisis in the financial industry. You can hear the voice of McCain's chief policy adviser, Douglas Holtz-Eakin as McCain says:

While I was traveling overseas, our financial markets experienced another round of upheaval. This market turmoil leaves many Americans feeling both concerned and angry. People see the value of their homes fall at the same time that the price of gasoline and food is rising. Already tight household budgets are getting tighter. A lot of Americans read the headlines about credit crunches and liquidity crises and ask: “How did we get here?” In the end, the motivation and behaviors that caused the current crisis are not terribly complicated, even though the alphabet soup of financial instruments is complex. The past decade witnessed the largest increase in home ownership in the past 50 years. Home ownership is part of the American dream, and we want as many Americans as possible to be able to afford their own home. But in the process of a huge, and largely positive, upturn in home construction and ownership, a housing bubble was created.

A bubble occurs when prices are driven up too quickly, speculators move into markets, and these players begin to suspend the normal rules of risk and assume that prices can only move up - but never down. We've seen this kind of bubble before - in the late 1990s, we had the technology bubble, when money poured into technology stocks and people assumed that those stock values would rise indefinitely. Between 2001 and 2006, housing prices rose by nearly 15 percent every year. The normal market forces of people buying and selling their homes were overwhelmed by rampant speculation. Our system of market checks and balances did not correct this until the bubble burst.

A sustained period of rising home prices made many home lenders complacent, giving them a false sense of security and causing them to lower their lending standards. They stopped asking basic questions of their borrowers like "can you afford this home? Can you put a reasonable amount of money down?" Lenders ended up violating the basic rule of banking: don’t lend people money who can’t pay it back. Some Americans bought homes they couldn't afford, betting that rising prices would make it easier to refinance later at more affordable rates. There are 80 million family homes in America and those homeowners are now facing the reality that the bubble has burst and prices go down as well as up.

Of those 80 million homeowners, only 55 million have a mortgage at all, and 51 million are doing what is necessary – working a second job, skipping a vacation, and managing their budgets – to make their payments on time. That leaves us with a puzzling situation: how could 4 million mortgages cause this much trouble for us all?

The other part of what happened was an explosion of complex financial instruments that weren't particularly well understood by even the most sophisticated banks, lenders and hedge funds. To make matters worse, these instruments - which basically bundled together mortgages and sold them to others to spread risk throughout our capital markets - were mostly off-balance sheets, and hidden from scrutiny. In other words, the housing bubble was made worse by a series of complex, inter-connected financial bets that were not transparent or fully understood. That means they weren't always managed wisely because people couldn't properly quantify the risk or the value of these bets. And because these instruments were bundled and sold and resold, it became harder and harder to find and connect up a real lender with a real borrower. Capital markets work best when there is both accountability and transparency. In the case of our current crisis, both were lacking.

Because managers did not fully understand the complex financial instruments and because there was insufficient transparency when they did try to learn, the initial losses spawned a crisis of confidence in the markets. Market players are increasingly unnerved by the uncertainty surrounding the level of risk, liability and loss currently in the financial system. Banks no longer trust each other and are increasingly unwilling to put their money to work. Credit is drying up and liquidity is now severely limited – and small business and hard-working families find themselves unable to get their usual loans.

The net result is the crisis we face. What started as a problem in subprime loans has now convulsed the entire financial system.

I'm not enough of an expert to evaluate whether this account of the troubles is accurate. What do you think?

Comments (23)

Seems like a pretty reasonable explanation to me. I am a financial trader (though not in bonds or over the counter derivatives).

Seems like a pretty reasonable explanation to me. I am a financial trader (though not in bonds or over the counter derivatives).

Admittedly, I am also not enough of an expert on this topic. But this line struck me as odd: "51 million are doing what is necessary...", as if to suggest that the remaining 4 million mortgage holders are shiftless bums. Perhaps I am reading too much into it, but it is the sort of language Republicans often use in the public benefits ("welfare reform") context.


A pretty good description except for this:

Historically, regulators are always one step behind the markets and only step in when markets blow up.

The problem is when you have people who are philosophically predisposed to either for or against regulation coming into the debate and failing to see the need to do one thing or the other.

Pragmatic regulation of 'exotic' financial instruments is long overdue. The stability of the financial system require it.

The problem is not only mortgages, but all collateralized debt obligations, credit debt swaps, and many other forms of presently unregulated financial / risk management instruments.

I am afraid, however, that it is going to take a much bigger collapse for the financial system to accept the need for regulation. That hasn't happened yet.

It's a good explanation, but he leaves something important out of the picture: tax deductibility of home equity loans encouraged homeowners to borrow against their equity for consumer purchases. They borrowed against illiquid (and ultimately illusory) rising house values to fund a lifestyle that was otherwise beyond their reach. With that kind of spending now dried up, we're in for some tough economic times.

Oh, and by the way, deductibility on the interest for home equity loans is crazy under current rules, because it's allowed no matter what you spend the money on. The government gives you a tax incentive to dissipate your home equity to spend on current consumption. It defeats the whole purpose of the interest deduction on original home mortgages, which is to encourage you to build equity rather than renting.

They should limit deductibility of interest on home equity loans to the cost of home improvements (and maybe other "capital" investments, like education for the kids).

This is a clear and accurate overview of the origins of the financial mess.

But from a policy perspective it doesn't tell you anything. The key sentence in this speech excerpt is this: "Our system of market checks and balances did not correct this until the bubble burst."

True enough. But the real question for McCain -- and I haven't seen the full speech so he may have already answered -- is what he would do about the market checks and balances. To what degree does he believe the problems resulted from lack of adequate regulations and oversight by the Fed and other regulators? What, if any, new regulations are required to prevent this kind of mess in the future?

There is, as economists like Roubini and Krugman have described, a "shadow" financial system that operated outside the reach of regulators. (McCain refers to them less darkly as "complex financial instruments.") That was fine as long as the risk was contained. But it isn't. What would a President McCain do about it?

The fact that his economic advisors also include Phil Gramm and Jack Kemp, and that he has continued to praise Alan Greenspan, who presided over back-to-back bubbles, is not encouraging.

McCain "provided this account". Does anyone think he read it? Understood it?

Two comments, one snarky, one serious.

I'll start with the serious one. McCain says "51 million are doing what is necessary – working a second job, skipping a vacation, and managing their budgets – to make their payments on time."

The not-so-subtle implication here is that the other 4 million are somehow goofing off, being lazy, or in some way not doing what is "necessary." If the current crisis is, as McCain seems to imply, a result of shiftless lazy people, well then the problem is easily solved -- make them work or don't let them have access to the home market.

Now I understand that plenty of people who had no business buying homes did so, and that that phenomenon is a big contributor to the crisis. But suggesting that these people -- who for the most part are honest, hardworking and decent individuals who desperately wanted to have their own home and thus live the "American dream" are somehow responsible is like suggesting that senior citizens who get conned out of their retirement should be held completely responsible for what happened to them. Are they culpable? Absolutely. Ignorance isn't an excuse. But are they SOLELY responsible? That's nuts.

Where in McCain's statement is any consideration of "accountability" for the predatory lenders, bundlers and other grifters who managed to con so many decent and hardworking people?

Where is the outrage that this system was allowed to exist unregulated?

Where is the sense that maybe, just maybe, we shouldn't try to put all the blame on the poorest people, the very people now living in much worse conditions as a result of this completely unnecessary crisis?

Where is the criticism of Alan Greenspan, the Bush Administration, and others who looked the other way when the real estate market began to experience a level of irrational exuberance that would have made the most avid internet speculator blush?

John McCain's (or his advisors') absolute incomprehension of what it's like to be poor and home hungry is merely the latest demonstration of his disconnection from the realities of what is happening both at home and in the world.

Now the snark. McCain says that "While I was traveling overseas, our financial markets experienced another round of upheaval." OMG!! Now we know what happened -- it wasn't subprime loans. It was letting McCain out of the country!! For God's sake keep him home!!!

Why can't anyone state the obvious?

That Alan Greenspan lowered rates to ridiculously low amounts in order to stimulate the economy under George W. Bush. Without the stimulus of the housing sector during Bush's watch, the economy would have flatlined, putting Bush's second term in jeopardy.

So Greenspan keeps lowering rates. This pumps more money into the housing market. Artificially increase home prices. Pushes ARM's that people shouldn't be buying.

I mean, come on, guys.

The housing bubble was a politically motivated event created by the FED in order to help George W. Bush. A ruse played out on the backs of American families who are just trying to buy a home.

The idea that Hillary Clinton would bring Greenspan back is as stupid as it is disgusting.

I think it is the common (but shallow) analysis of the subprime lending crisis, but I think it overlooks the fact that this behavior will not (and has not been) cured by simple learning from past mistakes. It ignores the important lessons of the behavioral economics literature and does so in order to avoid the implication that regulation is required. He ignores that the subprime crisis is just yet another example that markets (while tremendously powerful) are not fully efficient and market failures will occur quite regularly without gov't intervention.

Interesting point, Just the Facts. Do you have any links to articles explicating this view in more detail?

One couterargument I can see is that if the fed artificially pumped up the money supply, why wasn't there inflation? I guess maybe a partial answer could be that massive price-cutting from the rise of Chinese and other low-cost manufacturing disguised the inflation, but I'm not well-enough versed to know.

Another counter-argument: If Greenspan was in a position to lower interest rates and make homes more available without increasing inflation (because of Chinese priceslashing or whatever), wouldn't he have been criticized if he HADN'T done so? True, that doesn't excuse his cheerleading for adjustable rate mortgages and such, but still, would you have been urging him to keep rates high even if it wasn't necessary to check inflation?

Nobody is willing to look a the other credit -- the easy credit that bought curtains and shrubs for the yard of all those new homes -- credit-card debt.

I wonder how many folks found themselves with interest rates that went up on their adjustable rate mortgages, missed a credit-card payment or two, and then found themselves sliding down on 30% interest?

Any discussion of the housing-bubble bust that doesn't include this is disingenious.

Secondly, McCain doesn't really tackle the significant economic impact of large neighborhoods filled with empty, foreclosed McMansions. He's claiming Wall St. didn't understand the financial instruments that fought so hard to create? He may not understand them, but bankers did. So my admittedly narrow point-of-view here is that he's just trying to pass the buck back onto our backs to help the corporations and lobbyists who support his campaign.

Nobody is talking about the sinking US Dollar...

I wonder what schools did McCain's people attend. By the way this is written by an economist, I doubt McCain can understand it enough to present it on his own.

He has a point, but his solution is just flatout insane. In order to increase transparency he proposes to get rid of mark to market accounting. This is the opposite of a useful idea, some more thoughts: http://airingofthegrievances.blogspot.com/2008/03/mccaintradictions-jm.html

All I got was mush. Does McCain want to inject public fund into the financial sector? Yes or no.

The first two paragraphs read like his career bureaucrat Holtz-Eakin. Hopefully, the rest of the prepared reading included some sensible POLICY from Marty Feldstein or another accomplished economist.

To the question, Japan and Asia believe that recapitalization is paramount. Their top officials have provided advise—some of it is self-interest and some of it is true analysis of a—bankrupt—systemic breakdown with proximate causes ranging from a prolonged war (yes McCain's easy war), incentivizing unregulated speculation, mark to market accounting, organizational behavior of investment banks, and finally over-leveraging from the government to financial firms to consumers.

Now Barack and Clinton and Romney all provided serious policy. All McCain has done is to toss out this mush and some bizarre statement about punishing the Street--MCCAIN: I think that there is some greedy people on Wall Street that perhaps need to be punished. January 30, 2008. Simi Valley Debate.

[Reading the comments, I see that somewhere buried in McCain's BS was "mark to market" accounting. lol.]

The idea that people want to promote McCain to President is nuts. This guy has a laundry list of failure of leadership and of ethical failure.

" as if to suggest that the remaining 4 million mortgage holders are shiftless bums."

No, but a great many people bought more house that they could afford, aided and abbetted by real estate brokers and mortgage underwriters.

Quick anecdote: My wife and I bought our first home last March, we have a combind income of $80,000. We contacted our broker and gave him a list of houses we would like to view, and asked him to put together another list. Average price of houses on our list, $150,000. Average price of the houses on our broker's list: $350,000. We laughed and threw his list away.

I wouldn't go so far as to call them bums, but I would, fairly I think, call a great number of these people shockingly ignorant.

Here is the meat of his arguement:

"That means they weren't always managed wisely because people couldn't properly quantify the risk or the value of these bets. And because these instruments were bundled and sold and resold, it became harder and harder to find and connect up a real lender with a real borrower. Capital markets work best when there is both accountability and transparency. In the case of our current crisis, both were lacking."

And that is the bulk of it. Bundling mortgate debt for resale (CDO's) in and of itself is neither a novel idea nor a bad one. The lack of transparency in the original loan process (income overstated or flat out lied about on mortgage applications), unscrupulous brokers hungry for a commission, short-sighted lenders who never ask the fundamental question: "Can this person actually afford a monthly payment of $X?" greedy and stupid individuals viewing the home they lived in as some form of a credit card, house-flipping by people who had no business doing so, etc. Plenty of blame to go around, but more transparency in the lending process is a very good place to start.

" as if to suggest that the remaining 4 million mortgage holders are shiftless bums."

No, but a great many people bought more house that they could afford, aided and abbetted by real estate brokers and mortgage underwriters.

Quick anecdote: My wife and I bought our first home last March, we have a combind income of $80,000. We contacted our broker and gave him a list of houses we would like to view, and asked him to put together another list. Average price of houses on our list, $150,000. Average price of the houses on our broker's list: $350,000. We laughed and threw his list away.

I wouldn't go so far as to call them bums, but I would, fairly I think, call a great number of these people shockingly ignorant.

Here is the meat of his arguement:

"That means they weren't always managed wisely because people couldn't properly quantify the risk or the value of these bets. And because these instruments were bundled and sold and resold, it became harder and harder to find and connect up a real lender with a real borrower. Capital markets work best when there is both accountability and transparency. In the case of our current crisis, both were lacking."

And that is the bulk of it. Bundling mortgate debt for resale (CDO's) in and of itself is neither a novel idea nor a bad one. The lack of transparency in the original loan process (income overstated or flat out lied about on mortgage applications), unscrupulous brokers hungry for a commission, short-sighted lenders who never ask the fundamental question: "Can this person actually afford a monthly payment of $X?" greedy and stupid individuals viewing the home they lived in as some form of a credit card, house-flipping by people who had no business doing so, etc. Plenty of blame to go around, but more transparency in the lending process is a very good place to start.

As a person who worked in a Bankruptcy law firm, I thought this was a great discription of what is actually going on. I saw people come in everyday who didn't want to lose their home to foreclosure. It is a scary thing to get a certified letter saying the bank is taking your home away from you. The things that lead up to that point is just that people are over confident and excited when they first purchase a home. We are taught Math, history, English, and Science in school but what does that really teach us about the real world? Who can actually name a teacher that told you how to buy a house, car, or any other major purchase? It is a lack of education in this country that leads our citizens to making bad decisions, such as buying a house they cannot afford. Also, the other 4 million are just not doing what is necessary. Its so true. They go out and buy big screen plasma T.V.s on credit cards and have outrageous home loans with an ARM (Adjustable rate mortgage) and they don't consider that the mortgage payments will rise when interest rises. No one is educating people and people do not want to be educated on this matter because yes, owning a home is part of the "American Dream". Well our "American Dream" is being depleated by our not being able to eat inside that home. We can make payments on the house but we will have to live on Ramen noodles. Does no one else see this?

McCain has got cause and effect inverted. The problem wasn't caused when 4 million people stormed banks and demanded home loans they couldn't afford to repay, as this account suggests.

The problem began when financial markets invented exotic financing mechanisms that allowed people to make a ton of money off home loans, apparently risk-free. It got worse when the fedsupported and encouraged this risky behavior by financial leaders. Over time, the finance guys gave bigger and bigger loans to worse and worse risks, driving up the price of housing--which, in turn, encouraged finance guys to give bigger loans to worse risks because hey, worst case scenario is we just foreclose and sell at a proft or at least break-even, because our awesome new financial instruments have eliminated risk. Woo-Hoo!

Let's not forget that not only are most regular people pretty financially unsophisticated, but in addition, overwhelmingly, the American people were all raised on the idea that it's HARD to get a home loan, and the bank wanted to see its loan fail even _less_than the borrower did, so no bank would ever give you a loan that they didn't think you could repay. Hence, it's not very surprising that most Americans treated their home lenders like banks and not like loan sharks, and assumed that when the lender looked at all of their finances and gave them a huge loan, it's because the lender actually believed they could repay it.

McCain is fundamentally wrong in that it's not the little fish borrowers who created a problem by defaulting that the financial markets were poorly positioned to deal with because of overleveraging. The problem was caused by the big fish who created exotic financial instruments to "eliminate" risk, and then set up ever-stronger incentives for home lenders to take up loan sharking: giving millions of Americans loans they didn't reasonably expect they could repay. I'm sure some of these little fish realized they were in over their heads, but I expect a lot more were stunned at how screwed they were when their ARMs readjusted.

On the contrary, no one in the market believed these guys wouldn't default. They just believed the folks in the market wouldn't get hurt when they did default. So, the fault for this crisis overwhelmingly lies with the lenders who created and marketed a totally dangerous system, as well as the regulators who failed to shut it down--and very little with the borrowers who participated (many of them ignorantly) in it.

It's a pretty reasonable summary of what happened.

But McCain pulls a little rhetorical sleight-of-hand when he says that the problem with the complex financial instruments was that they "were mostly off-balance sheets, and hidden from scrutiny." The problem, which is now universally acknowledged, was that complex financial instruments were hidden from the regulatory regime. But as a good little conservative, McCain uses the word "scrutiny" instead, lest more regulation -- horror of horrors -- be regarded as a good thing. It's just McCain's (or more likely Holtz-Eakin's) way of keeping alive the thoroughly debunked theory that the financial sector is self-regulating because lenders sufficiently scrutinze their counterparties.

It's perfectly in line with what Alan Greenspan, who has long been the biggest pusher of the Wall-Street-is-self-regulating snake oil, wrote last week in the Financial Times: "Those of us who look to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder equity have to be in a state of shocked disbelief. But I hope that one of the casualties will not be reliance on counterparty surveillance, and more generally financial self-regulation, as the fundamental balance mechanism for global finance."

Translation: My theory that Wall Street is self-regulating was completely wrong and was a major cause of the current financial crisis, but that doesn't mean we should regulate Wall Street!

Yet nonsense like that still spews forth from places like the WSJ editorial page every day. It has reached the point of self-parody. But McCain is going along for the ride anyway. Not that I expected anything different...

I work for an investment bank subprime MBS trading desk; was a Rudy supporter originally and now am a McCain supporter (as the best of the three options).

The summary above is a surprisingly coherent summary of the evolution of the current financial crunch. Basically, as the housing bubble inflated, people--lenders and buyers--got sloppy and bought into the idea that house prices "can only go up". It was basically a ponzi scheme; buyers who bought more than they could afford (often by lying on their mortgage apps) could get out of trouble by selling to the next buyer; and lenders could pass on the risk of bad mortgages to investors (via a string of complex financial products--RMBS to CDOs--that are very difficult to analyze).

This game of musical chairs could only go on for so long; and once the music stop, the whole situation unraveled.

What worries me about McCain is 1) I don't think he actually understands what he said; 2) I'm not convinced he's surrounded himself with a ideologically consistent set of advisers; and 3) he's tempermentally disposed to finding compromise with Democrats on this type of issue.

Unfortunately, the only way to solve the problem is for house prices to [continue to] fall dramatically. This will result in more foreclosures; that's the working of the market. No matter what programs Hillary/Obama might want to put in to help home "owners", these actions would only serve to prop up housing prices artificially, thereby delaying the correction and prolonging the crisis.

Even worse, the MBS/CDO financing machine is closed for business permanently. Put simply, the CDO buyers who were inadvertantly/unknowingly financing many US homebuyers have now learned the hard way (through massive financial losses) not to buy this stuff; so no matter what legislation is passed, that massive source of financing is gone gone gone forever. Thus, even if the current crop of home "owners" is saved, the next crop of buyers will be crimped because of the lack of this financing mechanism.

I guess, long story short, we're either going to let the free market act and have 3 more years of harsh housing downturns and financial losses; or we're going to have government meddling and have a slow 5~8 years of moderate housing downturns and financial losses. The losses can't be avoided.

I'm an analyst and before that was a paralegal in the securitization (i.e. making high-rated bonds out of garbage loans) practice of a big law firm. I left before I, or the market, had any idea that was the nature of the beast.

I agree with just about everything Subprime MBS Trader said. The part of McCain's bit I really found misleading was its depiction of lenders as being cocky or lazy, and not caring about credit just because they thought prices would always go up.

The big problem that he obscures is that the lenders were not the ones who faced the risk of default. The loans were packaged, insured, and given high ratings by the big 3 credit agencies. So the people who ended up on the hook were, for a lot of this stuff, actually looking for low risk debt.

I think McCain dances around this issue because he doesn't want to propose any sort of preventive regulatory measures. I would like to see such measures, but then I'm an Obama supporter so anything that government can do, I think it should do.

I'm no McCain basher but I thought this was a horrendous speech -- ignorant, patronizing, devoid of serious solutions.

McCain's proposed measures boil down to meetings of bankers and accountants, unenforced pledges by bankers to be nice -- and, unbelievably, more tax cuts and less regulation for banks. belated awareness and begrudged concern. And his grammar betrays reflexive sympathy with the most powerful actors in the farce.

The speech approaches the current crisis from a "while I was sleeping" stance. "While I was traveling overseas," McCain informs his audience, "our financial markets experienced another round of upheaval." True enough, but where's he been in the eight months of upheaval prior to his recent trip? Throughout, he speaks about solutions in the future tense, as if someone has just brought him news of a new-breaking crisis and he's prepared to take suggestions. "I will evaluate everything in terms of whether it might be harmful or helpful to our effort to deal with the crisis we face now....I will consider any and all proposals based on their cost and benefits....I am prepared to examine new proposals and evaluate them on these principals." Fired up, ready to go! Ready on Day 1...more here.