The flashover in Georgia seems to have surprised everyone but shocked no one.
The analyst class in the United States explains it the boiling over of a longstanding ethnic conflict cross-pressured by international politics and resource competition; the violence probably inevitable: the active separatists in Abkhazia number about 18% of the population and are less Georgian than they are Russian; Russian "peacekeepers" have been in the region since 1994; both Georgia and Russia have taken turns playing provocateers, with Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili sharing the blame for the flare-up and Putin being blamed for a disproportionate response.
Conservative analysts (not just conservatives) see something much more dangerous. Robert Kagan speculates that it was intended as a loud announcement of the end of a 19-year hibernation by the Russians, a sudden, teeth-bearing growl, a prelude to an invasion of Georgia. Our response to August 8, he says, is a Munich-like test for our times. As usual, there's lots of tough talk here. What can the West do?
Because Georgia fought side-by-side with the U.S. in Iraq and risked quite a bit to join the "coalition for the willing," there seems to be an expectation that the U.S. should somehow assist Georgia's military in return. Even if the United States had the stomach to somehow intervene, it really does not have the wherewithal; most everything we have is tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan. Maybe the Navy?
Speaking of: if the conflict persists, will South Ossetia become like another Afghanistan, circa 1979-80-82-84, with the U.S. semi-covertly aiding Georgia's version of the mujahideen (who this time are allied with the government?) That won't happen.
So -- lots of tough talk with no real action. The U.S. looks weak.
Isn't this why we have an intelligence community? The National Reconaissance Office has the capacity to task its satellites to photograph the region; did they, in this case? The Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline runs right through the region; isn't that reason enough to keep close tabs on developments? Did U.S. policy-makiers not get any advance notice of Russian/Georgian troop movements? And who was in charge of the Saakashvili portfolio? Did the U.S. warn him against sending tanks into South Ossetia? If not, why not?
Are all of our IC resources tied up in the Middle East?
