The takeaway from Barack Obama's national security team rollout this morning is holism.
Announcing, at once, an attorney general, the homeland security chief, Obama's defense chief, his chief diplomat, his chief negotiator and his chief adviser sends the message that Obama's conception of national security includes the need to defend against terror attacks at home and to devise a sensible mechanism to detain and punish those who attack us. More prosaically, Obama has chosen to render the foreign policy decision making mechanism as a table, over which people will disagree to the point of consensus. Where White House staff ran ends around Sec. Condi Rice, even failing to read her in to certain programs; when the Department of Defense refused to consult with State and vice versa, Obama seems to be saying here that big decisions will be made by (Obama, of course) but vetted throuhg a very diverse group of experienced men and women with egos, staffs and different institutional prerogatives.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates and national security adviser designate James Jones will manage the withdrawal from Iraq and the transfer of operations into Afghanistan. Diplomacy and civil society missions will be subordinated to military missions for the time being. Jones will give Obama cover with the generals who'll be in charge of carrying out the new mission; Gates will give Obama cover with the Pentagon bureaucracy. Both Gates and Jones are adherents of what's come to be known as the "smart power" school of foreign policy, which locates them both outside of the traditional realist/idealist grid.
Jones, NATO's commissar, initially sold Afghanistan to NATO allies as if it were Kosovo; he soon realized that mistake and spent much of his term fighting for a different strategy and for more resources. Obama seems to appreciate the fact that Jones was able to change his mind and take a new course when evidence rendered his earlier assumptions inoperative.
Even with the Bush Administration's second-term renaissance, the Department of State is fairly demoralized, understaffed and underfunded. It will have to learn to compete with the DoD when it comes to the arenas of public diplomacy and peacebuilding. Its foreign service officers need to figure out how to use 21st century technology to communicate with the public. Clinton's primary challenge is managerial; she has to wrestle back resources, attract a new corps of diplomats, and justify State's place at the table.
There's a potential for intrigue between Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton, in part because Clinton-era NSC conflicts, and in part because their two missions overlap. It's not clear, aside from Obamanian symbology, why the post of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. needs to brought back to the cabinet. Rice will have a platform but no staff; Clinton will have a large platform, an enormous staff, but until she's given a specific portfolio, no defined mission. Obama may decide to expand Rice's role -- perhaps giving her the AIDS relief portfolio that's run out of the Agency for International Development.
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